This paper presents a benchmark for dependable systems. 
Introduction
Fault tolerance is an important issue in many computing applications. For instance, mission critical aerospace or railroad control systems need to ensure the safety of passengers, and banking and telecommunications systems must offer high availability to prevent financial losses. This paper presents an approach towards benchmarking of faulttolerant commercial systems. A fault tolerance benchmark is a metric that characterizes the fault tolerance of a system, along with the specification of the procedure for obtaining that metric. The benchmarking of fault-tolerant systems is the execution of the procedure for obtaining the benchmark metric. To perform benchmarking, a benchmark tool must be created. This tool is used to obtain the metric by injecting faults throughout a fault-tolerant system and generating a workload that causes those faults to result in faulttolerant activity. The significance of the measured metric must be viewed with consideration for the the fault models upon which the fault injection is based. This paper describes a fault tolerance benchmark that has been implemented on several fault-tolerant systems. The benchmark tool consists of a synthetic program that generates CPU, memory, and I/O activity based upon user specifications and injects CPU, memory, and I/O faults according to a specified injection strategy. The program can be configured to execute with different workload specifications (e.g., CPU-intensive workloads, VO-intensive workloads, etc.) and with different fault injection strategies. The injection strategies include random selection of fault parameters (such as time and location) from distributions (such as exponential or normal) and selection of fault parameters based on workload activity measurements such that faults are injected into components undergoing high activity, thus ensuring a high level of fault activation and propagation (presented as stress-bused injection in [ 111) . Two metrics are provided to quantify the system fault tolerance using the proposed benchmark: (1) the number of catastrophic incidents and (2) performance degradation.
The benchmark has been fully installed on two Tandem prototype machines, which will be referred to in this paper as (1) TMR Prototype A and (2) TMR Prototype B. An implementation is in progress for a third Tandem prototype machine (Duplex Prototype c), which is based on the Tandem ServerNet architecture[ 11. A brief comparison of the three machines is given in Table 1 . Because these machines are prototypes, the results are not necessarily representative of production systems. The benchmark results are given in Table 2 for a mixed (CPU, memory, and I/O activity) workload and a stress-based injection strategy. Table 2 shows benchmark results based on 50 runs of the benchmark program. The table shows that the same workload and fault injection method produces four catastrophic incidents in Prototype A, compared with none for Prototype B. This indicates that Prototype B, which is a later instantia- 
Related work is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 describes the benchmark procedure. The benchmark program is described in Section 4. Detailed benchmark results are given in Section 5. Section 6 addresses the applicability of the benchmark to different systems. Conclusions, including a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the benchmark, are given in Section 7. There are several different approaches to fault injection. A detailed discussion can be found in [4] . One importan1 approach is software-iniplemented fault injection (SWIFI) This method uses software to emulate the effect of lowerlevel hardware faults by altering the contents of memory or registers. No additional hardware is required. Some fauli injection tools based on SWIFI are given in Table 3 . FIAT Degradation Avg. injections to injects faults into the user process image in memory. FER-RAN uses software traps to inject faults. DEFINE is a distributed tool capable of emulating software faults as well as hardware faults. DOCTOR is used to validate dependability mechanisms and has been used on a distributed real-time system. Table 3 only contains tools that have been developed by universities. However, many companies have also developed internal SWIFI tools. In contrast to these tools, FTAPE performs fault injection on fault-tolerant machines. In order to inject faults, the normal fault-tolerant design must be bypassed. For instance, a fault injected into a duplicated memory must be placed in only one of the two memories. FTAPE also adds a synthetic workload generator and a workload activity measurement tool that enables the fault injector to inject faults based upon dynamic workload measurements. This type of stressbased injection ensures that a high level of fault-tolerant activity results from the faults injected. The purpose for the program is to develop a fault tolerance benchmark, which measures the ability of a system to tolerate faults, and also measures the effectiveness of the error detection and recovery mechanisms by quantifying the performance degradation due to faults.
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Related work
Relatively little research has been performed in the area of fault tolerance benchmarks. One area that has received some attention is robustness testing. Siewiorek et al. [lo] addressed the development of a benchmark for measuring system robustness. Crushme [8] is a program that executes multiple processes consisting of random data masquerading as executable code. Many illegal instruction, segmentation fault, and other exceptions are generated, which should he handled by the operating system. The objective of crushme is to test whether a user program executing illegal instructions is able to crash the operating system. CMUCmshme[S] is a similar type of program, but instead of executing random instruction code, it passes random parameter values to random system calls. Dingman [2] builds on the crashme programs to create a robustness benchmark for a fault-tolerant system. The method of testing involves the execution of system calls with incorrect parameters, which might represent software faults or data corruption. The response of the system (including correct operation and several levels of failure) is then measured. This work is valuable because it provides a method for quantifying the system robustness, i.e., the ability of the system to tolerate unexpected conditions caused by user programs. The method yields numerical results which can be used to compare different systems. As the authors point out, the objective is not per se to measure how well a system responds to faults that the system is expected to tolerate.
This paper presents an approach towards benchmarking of fault-tolerant systems and a specific implementation of benchmark on several systems. While it is true that this benchmark has some deficiencies, it does represent an initial effort that satisfies the definition of a fault tolerance benchmark given in the introduction and should motivate the discussion for the development of improved benchmarks. A discussion of the specific advantages and disadvantages of our benchmark can be found in Section 7.
Fault tolerance benchmark
Currently there is no accepted benchmark for fault tolerance. One of the goals of this research is to develop a benchmark for dependable systems. As pointed out in the introduction, our proposed fault tolerance benchmark consists of a synthetic program that generates CPU, memory, and I/O activity based upon user specifications and injects CPU, memory, and I/O faults according to a specified injection strategy. Currently the benchmark has been completely ported to two Tandem prototype systems: (1) TMR Prototype A and (2) Tandem Prototype B. The port to a third Tandem prototype system, Duplex Prototype C, is in progress. The first two are based on the same architecture, and complete results are available for both. The benchmark is being ported to Duplex Prototype C to demonstrate the portability of the benchmark to a widely different architecture (as well as challenges associated with such a port), and the benchmark also produces some results which provide insight into the machine's design.
The general method for the benchmark is illustrated in Figure I , which shows a single "run." The results for the benchmark are obtained from a series of runs with different workloads and faults. Each run consists of two executions of the same workload. During the first execution of An error is detected at time TI, and a recovery action RI is initiated and completes at time Tz. After recovery succeeds, faults are again injected until another error detection and recovery. This cycle of faults, detections, and recoveries is repeated until the workload completes. It is possible that a recovery action is initiated before Tendl but does not finished until after T e n d l , but Tendl is still used in the calculation of the performance degradation. After this first execution of the workload, latent faults are cleared from the system by forcing all components that have been injected to undergo recovery. Then, the workload is executed a second time, but this time without faults. This dual workload execution allows the measurement of performance degradation, which is calculated as where n is the number of faults injected. To compare the two workload execution times, the time overhead of the fault injector must be accounted for both workloads. During the second execution of the workload (i.e., without faults), this is accomplished by executing the fault injector without actually injecting faults (i.e., this can be viewed as injecting a 0-bit fault). If a catastrophic incident occurs, then the run is attempted again to achieve the same number of runs without catastrophic incidents on each system from which the performance degradation can be calculated. Note that a second execution of the same run may not result in exactly the same result because the faults may not be injected at exactly the times relative to the workload and thus fault activation and propagation will be different. This explains why a second execution of the same run does not necessarily recreate a catastrophic incident. A method to repeat catastrophic incidents based on the workload and faults injected is currently under development.
Our proposed benchmarking procedure is comprised of two phases. Phase 1 verifies that the machine tolerates ex-pected faults correctly and also evaluates the impact of the fault-tolerant implementation on performance by injecting faults that should be tolerated by the system. Phase 2 evaluates the reaction of the system to fault conditions that it may not be designed specifically to handle and thus demonstrates the degree of fault-tolerance beyond what is expected. In general, the difference between the two phases lies in the location of injected faults. For phase 1, faults are injected into only one component of a redundant set (e.g., only one CPU in a TMR set). For phase 2, faults are injected into all components of a redundant set.
It is important to note that the rate of fault injection i s much higher than the rate of operational fault occurrence. Thus, the fault-tolerant mechanisms for these systems art: stressed much more than with a more realistic fault rate. However, this higher fault rate is applied to all tested machines and is needed to produce results in a reasonabk amount of test time.
Phase 1
For phase 1 injections, three types of results were obtained:
ErrorBault Ratio: The ratio of the number of errors detected to the number of faults injected. The number reflects the extent to which the fault-tolerant detection mechatnisms were exercised. A low number indicates that the injections need to be performed more intelligently to obtain more fault-tolerant activity. The recovery due to one error detection may correct more than one error, thus lowering the error/fault ratio. For instance, if multiple faults are injected into one memory in the TMR set, then the first error detection will cause recovery for the entire memory, thus correcting all errors in that memory.
Performance Degradation:
The fault injection run is repeated without injecting faults. The time for the run with faults (Two and the time without faults (Twof) are measured.
Catastrophic Incidents:
The number of catastrophic incidents.
Phase 2
During phase 2, faults are injected which may not nece,ssarily be tolerated by the fault-tolerant system. The purpose of these injections is to determine how well the system under test can handle faults which it is not specifically designed to tolerate. This is an additional measure which can be used in a benchmark comparison of different dependable systems. Also, the study of the reaction to phase 2 faults may yield insights into the tested machines. For Prototypes A and 13, faults are injected into all three CPUs in the TMR confignration. For Prototype C, faults are injected into the multiple ASICs which comprise the high-speed router network connecting the processors and I/O devices.
The next section will provide a detailed description of the benchmark program that is used to perform the above benchmarking procedure.
Description of the benchmark program
The benchmark program generates the workload activity and fault injection needed to test a fault-tolerant system. The workload consists of a mixture of CPU, memory, and/or I/O activity based on user specifications, and the faults are CPU, memory, and I/O faults which are injected according to a specified injection strategy. The program is called FTAPE (Fault Tolerance And Performance Evaluator) and is based The FTAPE program has been fully implemented on the Tandem TMR Prototype A and B systems. An implementation for the third system, the Tandem Duplex Prototype C, is in progress.
Measure
Figure 2. Benchmark Program
Fault injector
The purpose of the fault injector is to inject faults that will stimulate fault-tolerant activity. These important issues concerning the fault injector are addressed:
1.
2.
Faults must be injected throughout the entire system under test. Software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) is used because it permits a great deal of controllability over fault parameters and allows a wide variety of faults to be injected. Because no additional hardware is required, SWIFI can offer more portability than other fault injection methods, although low-level fault injection mechanisms will still need to be designed for each system. To inject a fault, the system's implemented fault tolerance must be bypassed. For instance, injections into CPU registers or memory locations which are TMRreplicated must corrupt only a single component in the TMR configuration. Most SWIFI tools have not been implemented on fault-tolerant systems and therefore do not do this. Portability is required, since the fault injector is part of a benchmark program that compares different machines. A large degree of portability is attained by (1) using the SWIFI fault injection method and (2) separating the fault injector into a directly portable, highlevel portion and a small system-dependent, low-level portion (see Figure 3) .
Figure 3. Fault Injector Portability Interface
Since the benchmark is used to evaluate the overall system fault tolerance, faults are injected throughout the entire system under test. FTAPE partitions the system into three main areas: C P U , mem, and io. These same areas are targeted by the workload generator in order to increase the chance for the injected faults to be propagated by the workload. Each area requires a different fault injection method, which are described below.
Injection method 1: inject-cpu:
The CPU fault models include single/multiple bit-flip and z e r o k t faults in CPU registers. Faults are injected into CPU registers, specifically, saved (saved registers are those registers whose values must be preserved across procedure calls) general purpose and floating point registers, the program counter, the global pointer, and stack pointer. These registers were chosen because faults in these registers have a higher chance of propagation compared to faults in other registers (e.g., temporary registers). The method of injection involves the use of the memory fault injector. A copy of the CPU register set is obtained and placed in memory. The memory fault injector is then used to corrupt the memory location corresponding to a specific register. The copy ofthe CPU register set in memory is then loaded back into the CPU, thus placing the corrupted contents into the appropriate CPU register.
Injection method 2: injectmem:
The memory fault models include single/ multiple bit-flip and zero/set faults in memory. Faults are targeted at heavily used parts of memory. Faults are injected by directly modifying the contents of selected memory locations. The method of injection bypasses the normal memory access mechanism. A special device driver is created. This device driver is able to corrupt the contents of a specific memory location based on a given XOR fault mask (i.e., an XOR fault mask of 0x00000001 would flip bit 0 of the memory location). For TMR-replicated memory, only one component in the TMR configuration is corrupted.
Injection method 3: injectio:
The I/O fault models include valid SCSI and disk errors. Faults are injected into a mirrored disk system. The method of injection involves using a test portion of the disk driver code that sets error flags for the next driver request. Thus, the next request activates the error handler in the driver code, and one half of the disk mirror may be disabled. These three fault-injection methods have been implemented on the two TMR Prototype systems. The Tandem Duplex Prototype C is a new system which has been recently released, and for this system, initial work has utilized the built-in fault injection mechanisms (see Figure 4) ; the software-implemented methods will be included in the future. For the built-in fault injection, faults are injected by means of a set of XOR gates that were inserted into the original design. One input of each XOR gate is connected to a decoder, which then activates one gate. The logical value of the node on which the gate is inserted is then effectively flipped. Thus, activation of an XOR gate is accomplished by setting the appropriate value into the fault injection register which drives the decoder. Faults are injected into the ASICs that comprised the interconnect between the processors and the VO devices. Three types of ASICs exist. The router ASIC (ASIC R) forms the backbone for the interconnect. ASIC M serves as the interface between the processors and the routers, and ASIC I serves as the interface between the I70 devices and the routers.
Portability: Since one of the main purposes for the FTAPE program is the comparison of different fault-tolerant machines, portability of the program is an important issue. The program software has been written based on the UNIX operating system. Thus, the software code should port easily to most UNIX-based systems. The code for the implementations on the prototype machines required a total of 672 lines of C-language code out of 9172 to be modified. However, certain functions, such as the low-level fault injection mechanism will have to be written specifically for each machine. These mechanisms are listed below. Once these functions are identified, the fault injector software has been written to facilitate integration of these functions: (1) a virtual to physical memory address translation function, (2) a function returning the virtual addresses for the text and data regions for n specified process, and (3) a low-level fault injector. Also, the three injection methods methods described in this section refer to specific types of CPU registers (e.g., a global pointer) and I/O devices (e.g., SCSI) which might not be defined for all machines. These specifications need to be written in a manner to include all machines, but are sufficient to describe the current implementations. Figure 3 shows the fault injector code, which has been separated into a high-level part and a system-dependent lowlevel part The high-level code, which is directly portable to most UNKX systems, selects fault parameters (such as fault time and location) and places those values into the FI parameter interface block. The low-level fault injector, which is implemented by a device driver dedicated to fault injection, uses the values in the interface block to inject the actual fault into the appropriate system component. The system under test is viewed as being comprised of logical components (CPU, memory, and I/O). By viewing the system as being comprised of logical components, the same fauh sets can be used for different systems. This separate view of logical and physical components is supported by the separation of the fault injector into high and low-level as shown in Figure 3 . The high-level fault injector code injects faults into logical components, while the system-dependent, lowlevel code determines how injections into logical components maps to injections into physical components.
The device driver injects faults in such a way as to circumvent the normal fault-tolerance. For example, memory faults in a TMR system are written to a single memory a,$ opposed to all three. The functions other than the low-level fault injector should be available for most UNIX-based systems and simply need to be identified. These functions maif be available either as an option in the /proc file system or as a privileged function in the kernel, which can be accessed through a device driver.
Workload Generator
The main purpose of the workload generator is to provide an easily controllable workload that can propagate the faults injected by the FI. The workload is synthetic to allow easy control of the workload, based on a few parameters. The same areas that are used by the FI (CPU, mem, and io) are targeted for workload activity. The workload is composed of a mixture of the following three functions, each of which exercises one of the three main system areas intensively: 
Phase 1
The three types of workload functions are assembled into a workload process. Figure 5 illustrates how this is done.
The sequence of workload functions is randomly chosen. The frequency of each function type is specified before the workload starts. For instance, if a CPU-intensive workload is desired, the workload is specified to be 90-5-5, which means that c p u 0 is executing 90% of the time, men0 5% of the time, and l o ( ) 5% of the time. The maxloops variable in Figure 5 is chosen from a normal distribution with a mean of one second. Since the order of function in the workload process is chosen randomly, a specification of a differe n t random seed will produce a different workload. However, the relative frequencies of the workload functions will remain the same. For example, a 90-5-5 workload will remain CPU-intensive regardless of the random seed specified. 
Fault tolerance benchmark results
The benchmark procedure described in Section 3 was performed for the two TMR Prototype systems. The phase 1 and phase 2 results are presented below. Because the FTAPE tool has not been fully implemented on Prototype C. only phase 2 results are presented for that machine.
Phase 1 consists of injections that should be tolerated by the system; these injections are performed in order to verify that the machine tolerated expected faults correctly and to evaluate the impact of the fault-tolerant implementation on performance. The phase I results were obtained for only the two TMR Prototype systems. The results for Duplex Prototype C are not given because the full port of FTAPE to the that machine is still ongoing. Table 4 contains these results. For each machine, the results are categorized by the workload used during the injections (5-5-90 is disk intensive, 90-5-5 is CPU intensive, and 33-33-33 is mined). The nurnber of faults and errors are an average of the total number of faults injected and errors detected for each workload type, The errodfault ratio is given in the " E F ' column, the performance degradation is given in the " P D F ' columns, and the number of catastrophic incidents is given in the "Catastrophic Incidents" column. Twf is the time in seconds for the workload program to execute with faults; Twof is the same measurement without faults. The Twf and Twof values for Prototype B in Table 4 are larger than those for Prototype A because the total amount of workload activity was increased to account for the faster processor speed. The workload composition (relative mix of CPU, memory, and I/O activity) remained the same. The performance degradation numbers are generally higher for Prototype B, mainly because it contains more memory and hence requires more time for recovery. (Because the CPUs are in a TMR configuration, recovery entails copying the data in the memories of the good CPUs to the bad CPU. The more memory that needs to be copied, the longer recovery is.) The exception is the performance degradation for the 5-5-90 (or I/O-intensive) workload, which is much greater for Prototype A than for Prototype B. The difference here is the extent to which recovery of a disk mirror affects the workload execution. Prototype A uses an older disk file system, which incurs a greater loss of disk bandwidth during recovery. This effect can be easily seen when the 5-5-90 workload is executed while mirror recovery is constantly ongoing. Table 5 compares the execution times for an UO-intensive workload with simultaneous mirror recovery and without, for Prototypes Aand B. The table shows that Prototype A suffers a much higher performance hit when mirror recovery occurs. Statistical hypothesis testing shows that the mean performance degradation numbers for each type of workload in Table 4 are statistically different when comparing Prototypes A and B. Indeed, the hypothesis that the mean performance degradation for a particular workload is the same for both machines can be easily rejected even at a 0.005 level of significance. Phase 2 consists of injections that may not necessarily be: tolerated by the system; these injections are performed in order to evaluate the reaction of the system to fault conditions that it may not be designed specifically to handle and thus demonstrates the degree of fault-tolerance beyond what is expected TabIe 6 gives some phase 2 results for the three systems tested. The table contains two types of measures:
Time with
( I ) the average number of faults and time in seconds to the initial error detection and to a catastrophic incident, and (2) the type of catastrophic incident. For all phase 2 injections, a catastrophic incident is defined as the condition which prevents successful completion of the workload and is usually manifested as a system panic or hang. The "Others" category in the last row of Table 6 includes a premature workload process termination and an automatic system reboot. The fault injections for Prototypes A and B consist of bit-flips in CPU registers and memory. For Prototype C , faults are injected using the fault injection mechanism built into the three ASICs described near the end of Section 4.1. Of the first type of measures, two are especially significant: the average time to catastrophic incident and the time from initial detection to catastrophic incident. It is interesting to note that all three machines were able to continue cor- Also, all three machines detect their first error within an average of one minute. However, Prototype C is able to continue operation for a much longer period of time after the initial error detection. Part of the explanation for this effect is the different type of fault that is injected for Prototype C. However, a more important answer lies in the type of recovery attempted by TMR Prototypes A and B. Figure 6 depicts n situation where two phase-2 faults have been injected into the memories of CPU A and CPU B. The fault in the memory of CPU B is discovered first by the memory voter, which then fails CPU B. After CPU B passes a diagnostic hardware check, recovery begins. The memories of CPUs A and C are first compared and copied to the memory of CPU B on a block-by-block basis. When the block containing Fault 2 is reached, the mismatch between CPUs A and C is detected, and the system fails. However, there is one sequence of events that avoids the described catastrophic incident scenario and upon which an alternative, albeit more complex, hardware recovery implementation might be developed. A memory scrubber is implemented for both TMR Prototypes A and B. When the memory scrubber discovers an error in a CPU, it performs a memory block copy, but only for the affected memory block. If another error is present in a different memory block in another CPU, that error is not corrected until the scrubber discovers it later. Unfortunately, the memory scrubber discovers far fewer errors than the memory voting mechanism, because the memory scrubber is specifically configured to slowly traverse memory in order to minimize its impact on performance through memory contention. However, this type of strategy could be used to improve the recovery of CPUs downed by the memory voter. Referring again to Figure 6 , when Fault 2 is encountered during the recovery process and a mismatch between CPUs A and C is detected, the copy of that memory block for CPU B can be used to determine that CPU A is in error. CPU A can then be corrected at that time, and the recovery for CPU B can continue. This recovery process only fails when the memory for all three CPUs disagree at exactly the same memory location, which should be extremely unlikely. One drawback to this recovery method is the reliance on data in a failed component for recovery. Table 7 shows the results of injections into different ASICs in Prototype C. For these experiments, no recovery was attempted, thus causing the system to fail in every case. The fully operational system will, of course, be capable of recovery from errors. As previously mentioned in Section 4. I , these ASICs comprise thc high-speed interconnect between the processors and 110 devices. ASIC R is a router chip that provides the backbone for the interconnect, ASIC M interfaces the processors to the router ASICs, and ASIC I interfaces the I/O devices to the router ASICs. These results provide insight into the designs of the different types of ASICs and in particular highlight specific areas that should receive more attention. For example, ASIC I fails shortly after detecting the first error whereas ASIC M is able to forestall a catastrophic incident for a longer period of time. Interestingly, when faults are injected into all three types of ASICs, the mean time to catastrophic incident is longer than for faults into one specific type of ASIC. However, when such an incident finally occurs, more hangs than panics result, indicating that such incidents are more severe.
As a final note, one of the phase 2 injections into Prototype C caused a system hang after a single fault had been injected. This discovered a design defect, which illustrates the utility of the fault injection method in providing feedback to designers.
Application of benchmark to different architectures
An important consideration i s the applicability of the proposed benchmark to systems that are very different. A benchmark consists of a metric and the procedure needed to obtain that metric. The benchmark described in this paper specifies the procedure for the obtaining the metric in the form of a benchmark program. The benchmark program was initially implemented on Prototype A. Porting the benchmark to Prototype B was easily performed because both systems are based on the same architecture. Thus, the physical components, such as the TMR CPUs, that are targeted by the workload generator and fault injector are present on both machines. Although systems may differ in the design of their physical components, all systems possess certain vital logical components, such as a processor, memory, and U 0 subsystem. The faults and workloads generated by the benchmark program target these logical components. For example, faults are injected into the logical processor, whether the actual design is TMR or lock-stepped duplication. In both the TMR and lock-stepped designs, a single fault would be injected into one out of either two or three duplicated components.
When systems with different architectures are being tested, the benchmarking procedure needs to be specified in terms of fault models and workloads targeted at logical components. By viewing the system as being comprised of logical components, the same workload and fault sets can be used for different systems. This separate view of logical and physical components is supported by the separation of the fault injector into high and low-level as shown in Figure 3 . The high-level fault injector code injects faults into logical components, while the system-dependent, low-level code determines how injections into logical components map to injections into physical components. Prototype C is based on a duplex architecture that is very different from the TMR architecture. All of the high-level benchmark code has been ported to Prototype C, as well as a portion of the low-level code, which has allowed some results to be obtained.
One concern regarding the injection of faults into logical components is fairness. Is the injection of a single fault into one TMR CPU comparable to the injection of a single fault into one CPU of a gracefully degrading 3-CPU processor? Similar questions also arise for performance benchmarks.
For instance, is the execution of a large program in a smallcache system comparable to that for a system with a larger cache? These questions can be answered in the positive because one design is actually better able to handle the specific fault or program size mentioned. Fairness results by properly selecting a set of faults and workloads that consider the desirability of each design. In certain cases, the consideration is obvious. For example, a larger cache is almost always better for performance than a smaller cache. Other cases are more difficult. For example, two-CPU faults injected into the gracefully degrading 3-CPU processor result in fewer catastrophic incidents (because only a single processor is required for operation) but more performance degradation (because each additional failed CPU degrades the overall performance). Thus, care has to be taken in the selection of workload and fault inputs for the benchmark program.
Conclusions
This paper presents an approach for fault tolerance benchmarking. The benchmark consists of two metrics: number of catastrophic incidents and performance degradation. These metrics are obtained by executing the FTAPE fault injection tool. The benchmark has been fully implemented on two' Tandem fault-tolerant prototype machines: (1) TMR Prototype A and (2) TMR Prototype B. An implementation for a. third Tandem prototype machine, which is based on a duplex architecture, is under development. The experiments per-. formed on these prototype machines do not necessarily char-. acterize the operation of production machines, but the exper-. iments do demonstrate the utility of this benchmark in com-. paring the high-level dependability of different systems. The results show that Prototype B is more fault-tolerant than Prototype A, in that it suffers fewer catastrophic incidents under the same workload conditions and fault injection method.
However, Prototype B also suffers more performance degradation in the presence of faults, which might be an important concern for time-critical applications.
The area of fault tolerance benchmarks is just emerging. This work represents an effort to propose and demonstrate a fault tolerance benchmark and, to the authors' knowledge, is the first to develop a benchmark that represents the overall fault tolerance of a system. Several significant ideas are embodied in our benchmark: The system under test is viewed as being composed of logical components (such as CPU, memory, disk, etc.), which not only provides targets for fault injection, but also aids portability by defining fault injection targets in term of components that all systems possess. The fault injector and workload generator are both modular, which allows the benchmark to be easily reconfigured if the underlying fault models to be tested are redefined. Also, the use of a performance degradation measurement is unique.
Because our benchmarking approach is the first effort for fault-tolerant computing, some deficiencies exist: The set of fault models used for injection is not complete. To be more useful, studies should be conducted to determine a realistic set of fault models and workloads. Also, the fairness of thls fault models and workloads in discriminating among different machines needs to be studied further. While attention has been paid to portability, the benchmark has only beein ported to two machines of the same architectural family, and thus, increased portability for widely differently hardware and software platforms needs to be addressed. The outcome of each benchmark run is not repeatable, although the avernge of a series of runs is repeatable. Finally. the use of SWIFT techniques for fault injection imposes some limitations on the types of faults that can be included in the fault model sei:.
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